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EFFECTS OF A FINAL APPROACH RUNWAY OCCUPANCY SIGNAL (FAROS) ON PILOTS’ FLIGHT
PATH TRACKING, TRAFFIC DETECTION, AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
John Helleberg
The MITRE Corporation
McLean Virginia
Eighteen pilot participants with varying experience levels flew 36 approaches in a medium fidelity cockpit
simulator. Eighteen baseline trials were flown with a standard Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) and 18
trials were flown with the proposed Flashing PAPI (FPAPI). The results showed a significant increase in lateral
tracking error with the FPAPI as compared to the PAPI trials, but no increase in vertical tracking errors. There was
also a trend toward an increase in the number of radio communications with the FPAPI. Pilots were able to
determine runway occupancy status and land or go-around as required in both the baseline and FPAPI trials.
Introduction
On February 1, 1991 at Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX), USAir flight 1493 (USA1493), a
Boeing 737, was landing on runway 24L when it
collided with Skywest flight 5569 (SKW5569), a
Fairchild Metroliner, which was positioned at an
intersection awaiting clearance for takeoff on runway
24L. As a result of the collision, both airplanes were
destroyed. All 10 passengers and 2 crewmembers
aboard SKW5569 were killed, as were 20 passengers
and 2 crewmembers aboard USA1493 NTSB (1991).
As this and other recent accidents have shown
runway incursions pose a significant safety risk.
At present, there is no automated capability in the
National Airspace System (NAS) to directly warn
airborne flight crews of runway occupancy status at
either controlled or uncontrolled airports. The Final
Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS)
concept was designed to address the need to reduce
the potentially serious consequences of runway
incursions, specifically those involving an aircraft on
approach  while  another  aircraft  or  vehicle  is  on  the
same runway. The FAROS provides a visual
indication of runway occupancy status directly to
landing pilots through the Flashing Precision
Approach Path Indicator (FPAPI) FAA (2004). The
MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development (CAASD) conducted a simulation to
examine Human Factors issues related to the
proposed FPAPI implementation of FAROS.
Method
Experimental Task
Pilots  were  required  to  fly  several  approaches  using
both  a  standard  PAPI  and  the  new  FPAPI  system.
They  used  the  two  PAPI  systems  to  maintain  the
proper glide path and used the visual depiction of the
runway to align themselves laterally. To minimize
training time, pilots flew with the autothrottle
engaged and set to the proper final approach speed.
Their task involved tracking inbound to the airport,
completing a short checklist, flying a stable approach,
communicating with ATC, and determining runway
occupancy  status.  All  approaches  were  flown  to
runway 18 Center (18C) at Memphis International
Airport  (MEM).  There  was  a  continuous  wind  field
beginning at 3000 feet from 220 degrees at 20 knots
and decreasing to 10 knots from 210 degrees at the
airport surface. This wind field was used for all trials.
The time of day simulated a dusk environment that
was clear of clouds with some light haze.
Experimental Design
Each pilot flew two trial types, baseline and
experimental. The baseline trials were similar to
today’s environment with a steady PAPI and pilots
were  required  to  visually  scan  the  runway  to
determine its occupancy status. The experimental
trials included a FPAPI system, which provided
pilots with a visual indication of the occupancy status
of the runway. There were 18 baseline and 18
experimental trials for a total of 36 trials per pilot.
The trials were blocked and pilots flew one block of
18 trials,  took a short break, and then flew the other
block of 18 trials.
Within  each  block  of  18  trials,  there  were  16  trials
with intruding traffic on the runway and two trials
that did not include traffic. The no-traffic trials were
included to provide pilots an opportunity to land
without any traffic. These no-traffic trials were
randomly presented within the block of 18 trials.
During each approach, the intruding aircraft entered
runway 18C from one of two different locations. Half
of the intruders entered the runway near the approach
end at taxiway “Charlie 8” (C8) and the other half
entered the runway midfield at intersection “Delta”
(D). Half of the intruders entered the runway,
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positioned themselves for takeoff, and then remained
in position until the end of the trial requiring the
cockpit to execute a go-around in order to avoid a
runway incursion. The other half of the intruders
entered the runway, positioned for takeoff, remained
in  position  for  a  few  seconds,  and  then  began  the
takeoff roll,  thus clearing the runway in time for the
cockpit to land. The intruders crossed the hold short
line at two different points while the cockpit was
approaching the runway. Half of the intruders crossed
the hold short line when the cockpit was about 5
nautical miles (nm) from the threshold and the other
half crossed the hold short line when the cockpit was
about 2.5 nm from the threshold. Each of these three
factors was completely balanced across the
participants and randomly presented (without
replacement) throughout the 16 approaches, which
contained traffic, yielding a 2 (intruder type) x 2
(intruder location) x 2 (incursion timing) factorial
within-subjects design of intruder type. Each of these
eight intruder types was replicated, generating a total
of 16 legs with intruders along with two non-traffic
legs for each participant. Furthermore, the 18 trials
were presented twice to each pilot, once as a baseline
trial (no FPAPI system) and once as an experimental
trial  (with  the  FPAPI  system).  The  order  of
presentation for the two trial types (baseline and
experimental) was counterbalanced.
A single failure trial (miss) was presented to each
pilot on the last trial within both the baseline and the
experimental conditions. The miss trial was always
presented as the last trial during each block in order
to maximize the opportunity for pilots to develop
trust in the system. This trial simulated a “lost”
intruder that wandered onto the runway environment
without  being  cleared  by  ATC.  Thus  there  was  no
ATC communication with the “lost” intruder.
Furthermore, the FPAPI system did not detect the
intruder entering the runway, due to a surveillance
failure accordingly, neither the FPAPI system nor
ATC detected the intruder and a missed detection
resulted. This yielded two trials per participant for a
total of 36 failure trials.
Simulation Environment
The cockpit was an enclosed, fixed based, mid-fidelity
transport aircraft simulator (see Figure 1). It was
configured as a generic twin-engine, large weight
category, jet aircraft. It had an autothrottle system,
which was used throughout the evaluation to control
speed. The simulation included audio capabilities
supporting aircraft environmental sounds (e.g.,
slipstream noise) and ATC communication. A side-stick
controller was used for aircraft control. The center
pedestal housed the throttle quadrant, flap handle, and
speed brake lever. Twenty-one-inch touch-screen
displays were located in front of the left and right seat
positions and displayed the Primary Flight Display
(PFD) instruments and navigation information. A
nineteen-inch display occupied the center instrument
panel and displayed engine and flap status information.
These comprised the Electronic Flight Instrumentation
System (EFIS) displays. Pilots used the Precision
Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) and out-the-window
(OTW) depiction of the runway in order to fly the
approaches and navigate to the runway. The OTW
visual scene driver gave pilots a 130-degree virtual
representation of the outside world. For more detail on
the MITRE CAASD Air Traffic Management (ATM)
simulation facility see Oswald and Bone (2002).
Figure 1. MITRE Air Traffic Management Lab
Cockpit Simulator
Participants
Eighteen pilots were recruited for the simulation.
Nine were classified as General Aviation (GA) pilots
and nine were classified as Airline Transport Pilots
(ATP) based on their experience. The GA pilots all
indicated that they primarily flew piston aircraft (total
flight hours M = 2097, SD = 2729, and range 109-
8900). The ATP pilots all indicated that they
primarily flew turbine aircraft (total flight hours M =
8798, SD = 6954, and range 2300-23000). All pilots
were current within the previous three months.
Procedure
Upon arrival, pilots read and signed the informed
consent form, filled out a short demographics
questionnaire, and were given the experimental
instructions orally. They were told that the
experiment involved runway status automation and
that the first trials were for training and
familiarization with the simulator. Following this
brief description, pilots were given some oral
294
© 2005 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
instruction about flying the simulator then four
practice approaches were flown. A fifth trial was then
flown in which the FPAPI system was activated
when the intruder entered the runway environment.
This was the pilots’ first exposure to the FPAPI
system and was intended to capture a naïve response
to the system and elicit discussion following the
practice trials. Due to space constraints, the naïve
trial and subjective questionnaire data will not be
discussed here see Helleberg (2004) for details. Pilots
were then given a brief written description of the
FPAPI system relating to the function, system design,
and pilot procedures. After the pilot read the FPAPI
system description, the experimental and baseline
trials followed in a counterbalanced order (i.e., half
of the pilots flew the baseline trials first, the other
half flew the experimental trials first) with a short
break between blocks of trials.
Each trial began with the cockpit simulator aligned
with the runway and on the glide slope with the
autothrottle engaged and set to the final approach
speed. The pilot was told to assume control of the
aircraft and fly the approach using the simulator’s
side stick to track vertically and horizontally to the
runway. Along the approach the pilot was required to
complete a short checklist (gear down and extend
final flaps) as well as determine the occupancy status
of  the  runway  prior  to  landing.  A  confederate  ATC
provided normal take off and landing clearances on
the tower frequency and responded to any
spontaneous requests from the participant pilot. The
pilot was responsible for making all radio calls.
Results
Pilot Experience
Across the dependent variables, there were no
significant performance differences or interactions
with the independent variables between the GA pilots
and airline pilot experience groups. Therefore, the
data from the two groups were pooled for the
following analyses.
Decision Making Land/Go-Around
Each of the eighteen pilots flew 36 experimental
trials, in which they were required to determine the
occupancy status of the runway and make a decision
as  to  whether  it  was  safe  to  land  or  they  should
execute a go-around.  This yielded a total of 648
trials available for analysis (see Figure 2). Each pilot
was presented with four trials in which there was no
intruding traffic and a clear runway. Across these 72
trials all pilots completed the approach and landed.
The remaining 576 trials included intruding traffic.
On half of these trials the intruders remained on the
runway thus requiring the pilot to execute a go-
around to avoid a runway incursion. These trials will
be referred to as “go-around” trials. On the other half
of the trials the intruders departed the runway in time
for the pilot to land without causing a runway
incursion. These trials will be referred to as
“landable” trials. During the landable trials the
intruder would lift off of the runway when the pilot’s
aircraft was between three-quarter and one nm from
the threshold. The number of go-arounds and
landings, as well as the distance from threshold when
the go-around call was made, were recorded and
served as the dependent variables.
Figure 2. Experimental Trials Across All Pilots
Go-Around Trials Pilots initiated go-arounds on all
288 of the go-around trials. Therefore, regardless of
whether the PAPI lights were flashing or not, none of
the pilots landed on an occupied runway.
The distance from threshold when the go-around call
was made was available on 269 of these trials (due to
data collection errors, 19 of the trials did not have
distance from threshold data). Across the 269 go-
around trials, the FPAPI had no statistically
significant effect on the distance from threshold when
the go-around call was made (t (267) = 1.54, p ns).
When  the  PAPI  lights  were  steady  (n  =  135),  the
pilots made the go-around radio call at a mean
distance  from  the  threshold  of  0.75  nm.  When  the
PAPI lights were flashing (n = 134), the pilots made
the go-around radio call at a mean distance from the
threshold of 0.67 nm.
Landable Trials Pilots initiated go-arounds on 16
(6%) of the landable trials. Across these 16 trials, the
FPAPI had no statistically significant effect on the
number of go-around trials that occurred (χ2 (1, N =
15) =0.25, p ns). Furthermore, the FPAPI had no
statistically significant effect on the distance from
threshold when the go-around call was made (t (13) =
-0.33, p ns).
Across the 16 landable trials in which pilots elected
to go-around, nine of those occurred when the PAPI
lights were steady and seven occurred when the PAPI
648 Total Trials
72 No-traffic 576 Traffic
288 Go-around 288 Landable
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lights were flashing. Due to a data collection error,
one of the FPAPI trials did not have distance from
threshold data. Across the remaining 15 landable
trials in which pilots elected to go-around, the mean
distance from threshold when the pilots made the go-
around radio call was 1.22 nm (n = 9) when the PAPI
lights  were  steady  and  1.39  nm  (n  =  6)  when  the
PAPI lights were flashing.
Attention Allocation
During each approach, the pilots’ were required to fly
the aircraft and track their way to the runway surface
using the PAPI for vertical guidance and the visual
depiction of the runway for horizontal guidance. The
pilots’ ability to maintain the proper flight path was
used as a measure of attention allocation.
Flight path Tracking The flight path tracking error
calculation was conducted only on the portion of
each trial that contained traffic. This was done to
reduce any dilution of the errors during the portion at
the  beginning  of  each  trial  in  which  the  lights  were
not flashing or, in the case of the steady PAPI trials,
would not have been flashing. Root Mean Square
(RMS) errors were calculated for both the lateral and
vertical dimensions across the 576 traffic trials.
The FPAPI resulted in a statistically significant
increase in lateral tracking errors (F (1, 16) = 5.82, p
< .03). The lateral tracking errors increased from a
mean of  60.0  feet  during  the  steady PAPI  trials  to  a
mean of 66.8 feet during the FPAPI trials.
The FPAPI had no statistically significant effect on
the pilots’ vertical tracking performance (F (1, 16) =
0.00, p ns). The vertical tracking errors were similar
between the steady PAPI trials (mean of 76.3 feet)
and  the  FPAPI  trials  (mean  of  76.1  feet).  Figure  3
depicts the relationship between the state of the PAPI
and flight path tracking performance.
Figure 3. Pilot Flight Path Tracking Performance
Across Flashing Conditions
ATC Communications
A confederate “air traffic controller” (ATC) was
available to respond to pilot requests during the
approaches. Whenever the pilot contacted ATC, the
experimenter marked the data stream in order to derive
the total number of calls as well as the distance from
threshold  when  the  call  was  made.  The  number  of
communications and distance from threshold results are
described below. Eighteen pilots flew 36 trials each for
a total of 648 trials available for analysis (see Figure 2).
Each pilot was presented with four trials in which there
was no intruding traffic and a clear runway. None of the
pilots contacted ATC during the 72 trials that did not
include intruding traffic.
The remaining 576 trials included intruding traffic. On
the go-around trials pilots were required to make one
radio call to report initiation of the go-around maneuver.
On the landable trials, the pilot could complete the trial
without contacting ATC. The number of trials in which
pilots contacted ATC, as well as the distance from
threshold when calls were made, were recorded as the
dependent variables.
Go-Around Trials Pilots contacted ATC on all 288 of
the go-around trials as well as the 16 additional landable
trials in which pilots elected to go-around. This resulted
in a total of 304 trials, which required one
communication (i.e., notifying ATC of the go-around)
for the following analysis.
Pilots completed 223 (73%) of the 304 go-around trials
without making additional calls to ATC beyond the one
required communication to ATC indicating that the pilot
intended to execute a go-around. However, pilots made
two or more communications on 81 (27%) of the 304
go-around trials. On eight (10%) of the 81 there were
three communications. Across the 81 go-around trials
with two or more communications, the FPAPI had no
statistically significant effect on the number of trials in
which pilots contacted ATC (χ2 (1, N = 80) =0.01, p ns).
The distance from threshold when the initial
communication was made was available on 80 of these
trials (due to data collection errors, one of the trials did
not have distance from threshold data). Across the 80
go-around trials, the FPAPI had no statistically
significant effect on the distance from threshold when
the initial communication was made (t (78) = -0.83, p
ns). When the PAPI lights were steady (n = 39), the
pilots initially contacted ATC at a mean distance from
the threshold of 1.56 nm. When the PAPI lights were
flashing (n = 41), the pilots initially contacted ATC at a
mean distance from the threshold of 1.46 nm.
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Landable Trials There were a total of 288 landable
trials and, on 272 (94%) of those trials, pilots
completed the approach and landed. This resulted in
272 trials for the following analysis.
Pilots completed 223 (82%) of the 272 trials, in
which pilots landed, without contacting ATC.
However, pilots contacted ATC and made at least one
communication on 49 (18%) of the 272 trials in
which pilots landed. On three (6%) of the 49 trials
there were two communications. Across the 49 trials,
with at least one communication, the FPAPI had a
marginally significant effect on the number of trials
in which pilots contacted ATC (χ2 (1, N = 48) = 3.45,
p = .06). With the FPAPI there were 31 trials in
which pilots contacted ATC and with the steady
PAPI there were only 18 trials.
The distance from threshold when the initial
communication was made was available on 42 of
these trials (due to data collection errors, seven of the
trials did not have distance from threshold data).
Across the 42 landable trials, the FPAPI had no
statistically significant effect on the distance from
threshold when the initial communication was made
(t (40) = -0.78, p ns). When the PAPI lights were
steady (n = 13), the pilots initially contacted ATC at a
mean distance from the threshold of 1.68 nm. When
the PAPI lights were flashing (n = 29), the pilots
initially contacted ATC at a mean distance from the
threshold of 1.87 nm.
Complacency
Each pilot was presented with two “miss” trials, in
which an unannounced intruder entered the runway
environment requiring the pilot to execute a go-around
in order to avoid a runway incursion. This intruder was
always presented on the final trial of each block in order
to maximize the opportunity for pilots to develop trust in
the system. During both the steady and FPAPI trials,
ATC would not clear the “miss” intruder to depart ahead
of the pilot’s aircraft (as had occurred during the
previous 15 traffic trials). In addition during the FPAPI
trials, the FPAPI system did not detect the intruder and
the lights remained steady even though an intruder was
located on the runway. The goal was to build the pilots’
expectation that the FPAPI system would provide
accurate information (across the preceding 17 trials) and
then surprise the pilots with a system failure. However,
this yielded a limited number of trials for analysis and
accordingly the following results should be considered
preliminary.
Go-Around Decision and Communications All 18 pilots
detected both of the unannounced intruders regardless of
whether the preceding 17 trials had been with the steady
or FPAPI. The distance from threshold when the go-
around call was made was available on 34 of these trials
(due to data collection errors, two of the trials did not
have distance from threshold data). Across the 34 miss
trials, the FPAPI expectation had no statistically
significant effect on the distance from threshold when
the go-around call was made (t (32) = 1.20, p ns). When
the pilots expected the PAPI lights to remain steady (n
= 17), they made the go-around radio call at a mean
distance from the threshold of 0.73 nm. When the pilots
expected the  PAPI  lights  to  flash  (n  =  17),  they  made
the go-around radio call at a mean distance from the
threshold of 0.52 nm.
Additional Communications If the pilot contacted the
confederate ATC during the miss trial and inquired
about the runway status, the controller indicated that he
could not see anyone on the runway, thus requiring the
pilot to make his or her own determination of whether or
not the runway was occupied.  This frequently resulted
in multiple calls to ATC.  On 13 (36%) of the 36 miss
trials, pilots made a single call to advise ATC that they
were initiating a go-around.  However, pilots contacted
ATC  two  or  more  times  on  the  remaining  23  (64%)
miss trials.   On four (17%) of the 23, there were three
communications.  Across the 23 trials with two or more
communications, the flashing PAPI expectation had no
statistically significant effect on the number of trials in
which pilots contacted ATC (χ2 (1, N = 22) = 0.39, p ns).
Furthermore, across the miss trials, which had multiple
calls  to  ATC,  the  flashing  PAPI expectation had no
statistically significant effect on the distance from
threshold when the initial call was made (t (21) = 0.81,
p  ns).   When  the  pilots expected the PAPI lights to
remain  steady  (n  =  10),  they  made  the  initial  call  at  a
mean distance from the threshold of 1.56 nm.  When the
pilots expected the  PAPI  lights  to  flash  (n  =  13),  they
made the initial call at a mean distance from the
threshold of 1.37 nm.
Discussion
This simulation was designed to address a set of Human
Factors issues related to the proposed FAROS using the
FPAPI system. The primary purpose of the simulation
was to examine the most critical issues that could not be
safely tested during an Operational Evaluation
(OpEval). A secondary purpose was to collect some
preliminary data related to several operational issues.
However, due to the nature of simulation, these
operational issues cannot be completely resolved and
the data reported here should be combined with
operational testing data.
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.Pilot Experience
The pilots recruited for this simulation covered a
wide range of experience levels. However, the results
did not show any statistically significant differences
in their performance during the simulation.
Land/Go-Around Decisions
None of the pilots landed on an occupied runway
when  the  FPAPI  was  in  use.  However,  none  of  the
pilots landed on an occupied runway when the steady
PAPI was in use either. This indicates that all 18
pilots visually verified the validity of the PAPI alert
when  it  was  flashing  and  also  visually  scanned  the
runway for traffic when the PAPI was steady.
There was no increase in go-arounds when pilots were
flying with the FPAPI. Furthermore, there was no
statistically significant difference in the distance from
the threshold when pilots initiated their go-arounds due
to the FPAPI. The data did not suggest that pilots were
initiating go-arounds based on the FPAPI alone. Pilots
tended to notice the lights flashing then shift their
attention to scanning the runway for traffic as they
neared the threshold. This suggests that pilots were
using the status information provided by the FPAPI
appropriately and FPAPI is unlikely to lead to an
increase in unnecessary go-arounds.
Attention Allocation
The data revealed a statistically significant increase
in lateral tracking errors associated with the FPAPI.
However, there was not a corresponding increase in
vertical tracking errors. One potential explanation for
this result is that pilots may have focused their
attention on the vertical tracking due to the attention
capturing  effect  of  the  FPAPI.  This  may  have  led
pilots to neglect their lateral tracking performance
and concentrate on the vertical axis. However, the
amount of lateral deviation was relatively small and
may not be operationally significant, but should be
considered when making the decision to move
forward with an OpEval.
ATC Communications
The number  of  trials  in  which  pilots  contacted  ATC
and the distance from the threshold at the time of the
call were used as objective measures of pilots’
communications.
The data did not show any statistically significant
increase in the number of trials, which contained
communications due to the FPAPI. Also, the FPAPI
had no statistically significant effect on the distance
from the threshold when communications were
initiated.  However  across  the  trials  in  which  the
intruder departed (landable), there was a trend
suggesting that the FPAPI led to more trials with
ATC communications. This suggests that a FPAPI
could increase the number of ATC communications,
however, it is possible that as pilots gain experience
with FPAPI the number of ATC calls may decrease.
Complacency
All pilots detected both of the unannounced intruders
regardless of whether the preceding trials had been
with the steady or FPAPI. Furthermore, there was no
statistically significant difference in the distance from
threshold when the go-around call was made
regardless of whether the preceding trials had the
flashing or steady PAPI. Therefore, during the
simulation the pilots did not show any evidence of
complacency.
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